An empirical investigation into the Europeanization of fiscal policy by Lemay-boucher, Philippe & Rommerskirchen, Charlotte
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An empirical investigation into the Europeanization of fiscal
policy
Citation for published version:
Lemay-boucher, P & Rommerskirchen, C 2015, 'An empirical investigation into the Europeanization of fiscal
policy' Comparative European Politics, vol. 13, pp. 450-470. DOI: 10.1057/cep.2014.1
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1057/cep.2014.1
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Comparative European Politics
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Lemay-boucher, P., & Rommerskirchen, C. (2015). An empirical investigation into the Europeanization of
fiscal policy. Comparative European Politics. 10.1057/cep.2014.1
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
This is the author’s final version of an article published  in Comparative European Politics.  
Cite As: Lemay-boucher, P., & Rommerskirchen, C. (2015). An empirical investigation into the 
Europeanization of fiscal policy. Comparative European Politics. 10.1057/cep.2014.1 
 
An empirical investigation into the Europeanization of fiscal policy 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We investigate the Europeanisation of fiscal policy in the eurozone. So doing we empirically test 
the impact of a series of pertinent variables on eurozone Member States' fiscal policies during the 
1984-2006 period. In addition to a host of usual-suspects, we introduce two new measurements to 
capture a country’s Stability Culture – the effect of which has been not been addressed by previous 
empirical work. We find evidence that government debt is primarily driven by the state of the 
domestic economy. Virtually no empirical support for the claim that institutional, political or 
ideational factors influence the variations in gross debt can be provided. Specifically, our results 
show that neither a population’s inflation aversion nor policy-makers’ pledge to ‘sound’ public 
finances translate into lower deficits. 
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Introduction 
 
Europe’s sovereign debt crisis has brought the discussion about the causes of government deficits 
back on the round table of political scientists and economists. The underlying purpose of the debate 
suggests more than an aspiration to trail current events. Instead the increased interest in public 
finances reflects broader questions related to some of the key intellectual issues in political science 
such as the interaction between the economic and the political sphere or the impact of ideational 
structures on policy outcomes. According to Schumpeter (1991: 101), ‘public finances are one of 
the best starting points for an investigation of society, especially but not exclusively of its political 
life’. He argued that this is ‘true both of the causal significance of fiscal policy (insofar as fiscal 
events are important elements in the causation of all change) and of the symptomatic significance 
(insofar as everything that happens has its fiscal reflections)’ (ibid.). 
  
This article is concerned with changes in government debt as it seeks to investigate the causes of a 
country’s fiscal positioning. In particular, we account for various ‘causations of change’ exerted by 
economic, political as well as ideational factors and analyse the ‘fiscal reflections’ of EMU 
(Economic and Monetary Union) membership and its key fiscal framework, the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). We thus join the debate on the determinants of fiscal outcomes and consider 
our contribution as complementary to the many antecedents who scrutinised budgetary policies. In 
so doing, we will empirically test the impact of a series of variables on the eurozone states’ fiscal 
outcomes. Specifically, we seek to answer two related research questions: First, what is the impact 
of Europeanization processes on public finances? Second, what are the determinants for non-
compliance with EMU’s fiscal rules? Our findings suggest that the Europeanization pressures 
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exerted by the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP hardly affected public finances in EMU. What is 
more, we find strong evidence that government debt is primarily driven by the state of the domestic 
economy. We find virtually no empirical support for the claim that political and ideational factors, 
notably a country’s Stability Culture, influence the change in debt or compliance with EMU’s fiscal 
framework. 
  
This article complements the existing literature in four ways: First, we offer two approaches of 
addressing the Europeanization of fiscal policy quantitatively, employing OLS and probit 
regression models. Second, we introduce two novel measurements to capture a country’s Stability 
Culture, the effect of which has been not been addressed by previous empirical work. Thirdly, we 
account for both Maastricht and SGP pressures by constructing various Europeanization variables. 
And finally, our work is based on data ranging from 1984-2006, which allows us to include more 
years during which the SGP was in place. So doing, this article joins a growing body of research 
employing the Europeanization approach in combination with quantitative methods (e.g. 
Mastenbroek 2003) to overcome the conundrum of causality with which parts of the 
Europeanization literature are said to be marred. The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. 
First, we explore the concept of Europeanization and review related works on the Europeanization 
of fiscal policy. The subsequent section discusses our model specifications and data. The fourth 
section presents the empirical results and the final section concludes. 
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Europeanization and fiscal policy  
 
According to Page (2003: 163), Europeanization is understood to be the impact the EU has on 
‘specific institutions and practices across a wide range of state activity’. Since the mid-1990s, a vast 
body of literature used this concept to explain European integration (e.g. Dyson 2007). We are 
interested in the impact EMU membership has on the fiscal policy of its states. The central 
European Union (EU)-level instrument constructed to bring about the Europeanization of fiscal 
policy is the SGP.i Since its creation in 1997, the Pact has been at the centre of EMU debates 
raising questions that go beyond monetary integration and enter the realm of national sovereignty, 
the role of EU institutions and its body of law. Its most important (and controversial) components 
are deficits and debt level limits (below 3 and 60 per cent of GDP respectively). Ultimately, the 
Pact aims at ensuring that the constraints placed on member states prior to the introduction of the 
euro (via the Maastricht convergence criteria) would persist once EMU was established. Thus, its 
purpose is to guarantee sound public finance and prevent free-riding on other members states’ fiscal 
prudence.  
Previous qualitative studies on the Europeanization of fiscal policy have predominantly focused on 
single-country cases (e.g. Kaarlejarvi 2009) and portrayed a diversified landscape of evidence. In a 
similar vein, empirical studies present ambiguous evidence about the determinants of fiscal 
prudence in EMU. Freitag and Sciarini (2001) have used results from a pooled time-series analysis 
based on 14 countries for the 1978-97 period and find little significant impact from the Maastricht 
Treaty. Hughes Hallett and Lewis (2008) use different indicators for the Maastricht phase (1992-97) 
and SGP phase (1998-2002) for the 15 countries that were members of the EU at the launch of the 
single currency. Their results tend to show that the new fiscal discipline was temporary (ceasing in 
1997) and a likely due to a fear of being denied entry to monetary union. Annett (2006) analyses the 
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Europeanization effect on fiscal policy by using a sample of 14 EU countries for the 1980-2004 
period. He compares the impact of various variables on the cyclically-adjusted primary balance for 
different sub-periods. Busemeyer (2004) uses a sample of 22 OECD countries spanning 1980 to 
2000. This analysis does not distinguish between SGP and Maastricht pressures and shows that the 
SGP has disciplined national public finances. Hallerberg et al. (2007) use a sample covering the 
years 1985-2004 of the EU 15 member states. They control for Europeanization by introducing a 
convergence indicator for the years 1992-97 that is based on the distance to the reference value for 
the deficit-to-GDP ratio of three per cent. This indicator is found to have no significant impact 
across their different specifications. 
  
Whilst all of these studies make important claims about the impact of the Europeanization pressures 
exerted by EMU membership on fiscal policy controlling for various economic, political and 
institutional variables, they tend to underplay the role of public opinion and policy-makers 
ideational outlook in their analyses. Apart from the inclusion of binary and arguably simplistic 
variables (such as the distinction between left and right wing governments), no empirical work, to 
our knowledge, has unravelled the impact of EMU-specific ideational variables on the 
Europeanization of fiscal policy. Our article seeks to contribute to the exploration of this empirical 
blind spot. 
  
Ideational structures shape and legitimize political decisions. The ideational grounding of salient 
economic issues is hence thought to be an important component of the domestic as well as the EU-
wide political environment which impact on macroeconomic policy-making. In the past decade, the 
development of ideational approaches has provided inroads into studying Europeanization 
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processes and pressures. Analysing the bumpy road to Maastricht and the eventual creation of the 
SGP, several qualitative studies have stressed the importance of the ideas that informed the 
roadmap towards EMU and looked at the interplay between ideology and European integration (e.g. 
McNamara 1998). Social Constructivist accounts of the creation and implementation of EMU are 
united by a shared focus on paradigms and norms that is the fundamental principles which are 
maintained over a long period and which are consistent with the Weltanschauung of their holders. 
In the case of EMU, the crucial paradigm in question is the so-called stability paradigm, which is in 
turn linked to the notion of Stability Culture as the central ‘frame’ (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999) for 
the Europeanization of fiscal policy. 
  
Drawing on this small but well-informed literature (especially Dyson 2000), we understand the term 
Stability Culture as a common economic policy perspective shared by policy-makers and the 
population at large whose primary concern is the maintaining of low deficits and low inflation. 
Hayo (1998) claims that the design of the ECB is merely one part of a stability regime that has to be 
boosted with public attitudes. Public opinion is thus said to become a ‘significant precondition’ 
(ibid. 244) for achieving a low inflation rate and low deficits. Häder and Niebaum (1997: 95) even 
go so far as to state that ‘Stability Culture is the most precious element of a stable currency’ making 
this ideational ingredient a key lever of success or failure for the Europeanization of fiscal policy. 
The German Chancellor Angela Merkel (2010) recently espoused this claim amidst the turmoil the 
sovereign debt crisis when she promised to ‘make sure together with our partners that the whole of 
Europe commits herself to a new Stability Culture’. Although references about EMU’s Stability 
Culture are a recurring feature of academic literature and political discourse alike, we still lack a 
deeper understanding of how the anchorage of Stability Culture impacts on the Europeanization of 
fiscal policy. Put differently, does a nation’s Stability Culture influence compliance with EMU’s 
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fiscal rules as suggested by Merkel? And more broadly, what is the impact of this particular 
economic paradigm on fiscal policy outcomes? By including two proxies for Stability Culture, one 
policy-maker one population centred, we account for the relationship between macroeconomic 
developments and ideological variables as Frieden and Jones (1998: 163-87) called for. 
  
Quantifying the Europeanization of fiscal policy 
  
Despite being highly innovative and having yielded relevant insight, Europeanization research is 
said to suffer from vagueness of causality (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009). What constitutes 
dependent and independent variables is often poorly defined and how to measure Europeanization is 
not always adequately addressed. While it might be less feasible to apply the strict logic of statistics 
to other domains of European integration, the use of its principles is unambiguous when it comes to 
fiscal policy.ii The yardstick for public finance in the eurozone as expressed in Art. 126 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, gives explicitly numeric objectives based on 
which a compliance dummy can be created. What is more, the Europeanization pressures thought to 
be exerted by the Maastricht Treaty and subsequently the SGP are straightforward to locate in time 
and hence to transform into year-based dummy variables. This approach to Europeanization enables 
us to answer two related research questions: First, what is the impact of Europeanization pressures 
on public finances? Secondly, what are the determinants for non-compliance with EMU’s fiscal 
rules? 
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This analysis incorporates previous work undertaken by Hallerberg et al. (2007), which itself is 
based on the seminal work of Roubini and Sachs (1989). Our dataset is an extended version of the 
one found in Darby and Melitz (2008). It covers the 1984-2006 periods for ten founding member 
states of EMU.iii We start our analysis in 1984 following the famous 'U-turn' in French economic 
policy in 1983, in which the government moved away from Keynesian expansion toward austerity 
and deregulation. To avoid capturing any extraordinary effects due to the past financial and 
economic crisis, which might bias our results, the time span of this analysis ends in 2006 and the 
impact of the recent economic and political turmoil is thus not considered. Political variables are 
taken from Armingeon et al. (2008). The linear specification used is as follows: 
  
The dependent variable is the change in general government gross public debt as a share of GDP for 
country i at time t, t = (1, …, T). One main reason for the use of this variable (as opposed to central 
government debt or the central government deficit) is that it renders the results comparable to 
previous studies in the literature. What is more, it is the most relevant variable within the European 
fiscal framework under the aegis of the SGP. The regressors include an autoregressive process. The 
lagged change in the debt level is added to reflect the fiscal starting point of a government by taking 
into account its legacy debt. Other macroeconomic variables are included in matrix X = {lagged 
debt level, real GDP growth, change in unemployment rate, debt servicing costs}. The next two 
variables will impact on government debt through automatic stabilisers and discretionary measures 
aiming at economic stabilisation. The impact of interest payments on governments is captured via 
the 'debt servicing costs' variable. Table A1 in the Appendix gives a full description of all variables. 
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Matrix S = {population, openness, output volatility} comprises variables describing structural 
characteristics that may affect the budgetary performance. ‘Population’ can have both economic and 
political implications pertinent to debt levels. A larger country could benefit from economies of 
scale in the production of public services. Population would thus be negatively correlated to 
spending and deficit levels. Alternatively, the bigger the country the more political weight it has in 
international negotiations. Consequently, it may face fewer problems breaching the Pact. The 
variable ‘openness’ is included as a measure of the national economy’s exposure to external 
competition.iv Finally, ‘output volatility’ is positively linked with the demand for fiscal insurance. 
There should be no deficit bias over a given cycle since insurance is designed to be provided by the 
automatic stabilization of disposable income. However, a deficit bias may arise if the policy 
reaction to economic fluctuations is asymmetric. 
  
The matrix P comprises six political controls, P = {election year, right, centre, single majority, 
minority, gov_gap}. ‘Election year’ is a dummy taking value one if (at least) one election of the 
national parliament (lower house) took place during the year and zero otherwise. The political 
processes surrounding public finance have been elucidated by the political economy of public 
deficits. One of the central hypotheses of this approach revolves around the electoral business cycle 
based on the premise that policy-makers are opportunistic and voters myopic. Consequently the 
production of public policy is such as to secure re-election operating on a short time-horizon. 
Assuming that the expected support for a party will rise with the welfare it promises to deliver, 
deficits are higher in election years when incumbent governments try to buy electoral support 
(Nordhaus 1975). 
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‘Right’ and ‘centre’ account for the distribution of power among right wing, centre and left wing 
parties, utilising the percentage of total cabinet posts filled, weighted by days. The analysis of the 
impact of political parties and their ideological inclinations has been the target of considerable 
scrutiny since the early 1970s. Proponents of the left-right hypothesis of public deficit argue for a 
causal relation between political variables and policy outputs (Hibbs 1977). ‘Single majority’ and 
‘minority’ account for the type of government in power: ‘single majority’ is a dummy taking value 
one if a single party is governing with a majority and zero otherwise. ‘Minority’ takes value one if a 
single party minority, or multiparty minority, or caretaker government is in place and zero 
otherwise. In their seminal work on political determinants on budget deficits, Roubini and Sachs 
(1989) have argued that ‘weaker governments’, where weakness is indicated by the presence of 
many political parties in the ruling coalition, are prone to run larger deficits. Policy-makers are 
equipped with ideological outlooks, which shape their stances on fiscal policy. The argument then 
suggests that such differences, and the potentially irreconcilable policy preferences, result in larger 
deficits due to ill-designed compromises. Finally, we include the variable ‘gov_gap’ measuring the 
ideological gap between the new cabinet and the old one, calculated as the difference of the index 
value of the outgoing and the incoming government (cf. Table A1). According to the intuition 
described above we would expect a swing towards a left cabinet to bring an increase in spending 
and a reduction for a swing towards the right. 
  
Matrix E= {SGP, Maastricht, SGP_Maastricht} contains three Europeanization variables.v 'SGP' is 
a dummy which takes value one if the country is a member of the eurozone and zero otherwise. 
This applies for the subset of years 1998 to 2006. In order to enrich our analysis we have 
incorporated a Maastricht effect: a dummy which takes value one for the year 1992-97 and zero 
otherwise for the same countries.vi It aims at capturing the process of fiscal consolidation between 
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1992 and 1997 in the run up to EMU. This variable measures the Europeanization effects prior to 
the creation of the SGP. Another variable was alternatively used in our analysis: ‘SGP_Maastricht’ 
which is the sum of both ‘SGP’ and ‘Maastricht’. We accounted for the Europeanization of fiscal 
policy by running regressions with ‘SGP’ and alternatively with ‘SGP_Maastricht’ and both with 
‘SGP’ and ‘Maastricht’ separately. 
  
Matrix I = {inflation aversion, economic orthodoxy} comprises variables pertaining to the 
anchorage of Stability Culture within policy-makers and the population. It seeks to account for the 
ideational outlook of policy-makers and the population at large that is widely attributed to impact 
on the Europeanization of fiscal policy, beyond the inclusion of the political controls.vii First, the 
variable ‘inflation aversion’, which is indicated by the percentage of respondents naming the fight 
against inflation as one of the two most important priorities, is taken as a proxy for the ideational 
grounding of the stability paradigm in the broader population.viii Similar approaches to measuring 
inflation aversion, – which use survey questions specifically about inflation without making explicit 
reference to other economic policy objectives which might be in conflict with achieving inflation –
 can be found in Ehrmann and Tzamourani (2009), Hayo (1998), and Farvaque and Mihailov 
(2009). 
  
The Eurobarometer data on which ‘inflation aversion’ is based, is discontinuous: the first wave of 
collection covered the 1984-93 and the second 2003-06 period. Moreover, the availability of data 
varies from country to country and the questionnaire used in this survey changed during the time 
span of the analysis.ix In addition, there are pitfalls in interpreting attitudinal surveys more 
generally. Notably, there is the question of comparability, which queries the extent to which one 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
country result can be seen on a par with another. In order to minimise this problems, we run our 
regressions by replacing ‘inflation aversion’ with its standardised country-wise version and 
alternatively by weighting it by its corresponding yearly inflation value. To further hone our proxy 
we also construct a measure of ‘inflation aversion’ with the residuals from a regression of inflation 
worry on actual inflation (with different number of lags) and the contemporaneous value of the 
mean inflation of EMU countries in order to control for neighbouring countries effect. 
Instrumenting this way, we seek to capture ‘inflation aversion’ purged from 'economic noises'. In 
addition we compute the residuals incorporating a measure of the Central Bank Independence (CBI) 
taken from Cukierman et al. (1992) which aims at controlling for people’s perception of the 
credibility of their institutions in maintaining low levels of inflation. Thoroughly controlling for the 
two most often-cited factors driving inflation aversion (actual inflation and CBI), allows us to treat 
the answers to this Eurobarometer question as a proxy for popular inflation aversion. 
  
The second ideational variable is ‘economic orthodoxy’. Whilst the first proxy measured the 
anchorage of Stability Culture in the population at large, this measurement accounts for the 
ideational commitment to Stability Culture of the government.x It is based on the Comparative 
Manifesto Project (CMP) produced by Klingemann et al. (2006) which counts mentions in party 
manifestos that relate positively (or negatively) to particular policies. Specifically, we take the 
measurement for ‘economic orthodoxy’ as an indicator for the government’s ideational outlook. 
This variable represents the percentage of sentences (with respect to the overall number of 
sentences) in the parties’ election programs which comprised of positive statements with respect to 
reduction of budget deficits, retrenchment in crisis, thrift and savings in the face of economic 
hardship, support for traditional economic institutions such as stock market and banking system and 
support for strong currency, – all of which are key ingredients for a strong Stability Culture. If there 
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is more than one party in a coalition government, the government’s index value is an average of the 
separate index values of all coalition partners, weighted by their seats in parliament.xi 
  
Empirical results 
  
In this section we present the results of our empirical estimation, for a discussion on econometrical 
issues and estimation techniques see Appendix 1. Table 1 displays the results of our investigation 
into the determinants of public debt for our sample from four different specifications.xii The first 
column shows the estimates for the baseline model which includes only the macroeconomic 
variables and the three structural characteristics. This model has a strong explanatory power, as can 
be seen with the high Wald statistics, and explains 67 per cent of the variations in the dependent 
variable. Jointly, all macroeconomic variables are significant and, with the exception of the change 
in unemployment rate, they are all individually significant.xiii Indeed, these macroeconomic 
variables account for most of the explanatory power (if the structural characteristics of this baseline 
specification are taken out, an R-square of 0.65 is obtained). The lag change in general government 
gross public debt as share of GDP (in per cent) has a positive impact underlining the presence of an 
auto-regressive process.xiv A high change in debt to GDP ratio in the past is likely to impact 
positively on the contemporaneous variation of debt. However, the lagged debt level has a smaller 
negative coefficient. This suggests that countries raise their budget balances in reaction to past 
fiscal deficits. Hallerberg et al. (2007) explain this phenomenon by arguing that in theory member 
states tend to respect their inter-temporal budget constraints. The variable real GDP growth has a 
strong negative impact. Surprisingly, yearly variations in unemployment produce no significant rise 
in public debt.  
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Table 1. The impacts of different sets of control variables on public debt (∆debt) 
  coeff.   se coeff.   se coeff.   se coeff.   se 
∆debtt-1 0.10 * 0.06 0.09 * 0.06 0.14 ** 0.06 0.12 ** 0.06 
Debtt-1 (level) -0.04 *** 0.01 -0.05 *** 0.01 -0.02 
 
0.01 -0.02 ** 0.01 
real GDP growth 
in % -0.40 *** 0.15 -0.26 * 0.16 -0.20 
 
0.25 -0.15 
 
0.23 
∆unemployment 
rate 0.29 
 
0.27 0.25 
 
0.27 1.07 *** 0.37 0.91 *** 0.34 
debt service costs 1.01 *** 0.17 1.17 *** 0.18 0.89 *** 0.23 0.85 *** 0.22 
openness -0.01 
 
0.01 -0.01 
 
0.01 -0.01 
 
0.01 -0.01 * 0.01 
population 0.01 
 
0.01 0.01 
 
0.01 0.01 
 
0.01 0.00 
 
0.01 
output volatility 0.68 *** 0.26 0.79 *** 0.26 0.00 
 
0.52 0.26 
 
0.46 
SGP 
   
0.69 
 
0.65 0.14 
 
0.78 -0.57 
 
0.84 
election year 
   
0.21 
 
0.37 
   
-0.01 
 
0.51 
Right 
   
0.00 
 
0.01 
   
-0.01 
 
0.01 
Centre 
   
0.01 
 
0.01 
   
-0.02 
 
0.01 
single majority 
   
1.02 
 
0.92 
   
-0.63 
 
1.11 
Minority 
   
-0.71 
 
0.53 
   
-2.33 *** 0.87 
gov_gap 
   
-0.09 
 
0.26 
   
0.24 
 
0.29 
Inflation aversion 
      
0.39 
 
0.33 0.42 
 
0.31 
Economic 
orthodoxy 
      
0.04 
 
0.06 0.05 
 
0.05 
Constant term 3.01 *** 0.74 2.09 *** 0.73 1.62 
 
1.30 3.92 ** 1.71 
Nobs 209 
  
209 
  
102 
  
102 
  R2 0.67 
  
0.68 
  
0.65 
  
0.68 
  Wald Statistic 323 ***   359 ***   171 ***   239 ***   
Standard errors are corrected for groupwise heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across countries 
of the error terms with panel-corrected standard errors. 
* Significant at the 10 % level; ** at the 5 % level; *** at the 1% level. 
  
The strong significance of macroeconomic variables should come as no surprise since many major 
areas of public spending such as unemployment compensation, social welfare expenditure, early 
retirement benefits, job retraining, and subsidies for ailing firms are inherently counter-cyclical. 
Thus, fiscal policy-making is likely to follow a pattern of economic path-dependency. During times 
of sluggish economic growth, it becomes more politically costly for politicians to follow the policy 
prescriptions of EMU's stability credo. In theory, EMU member states are expected to cut deficits in 
the good times and to increase their margin of manoeuvre in bad times. Yet, the Pact has no real 
‘stick’ to enforce such cyclical behaviour (for a discussion on hard vs. soft law see Begg and 
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Schelkle 2004). Hence, this asymmetric design adds to the negative effect of bad economic 
conditions. This relationship is hardly unique to EMU. However, the fundamentally different 
degrees of Europeanization between monetary and fiscal policy reinforce this pattern as the 
introduction of one monetary policy controlled by the ECB renders fiscal policy both economically 
and politically more important as a policy instrument. 
  
Apart from output volatility, the structural characteristics are not individually significant. Despite 
the fact that all three are jointly significant (p-value of 0.02), as mentioned above, these factors only 
make a marginal contribution to the explanatory power of the model. Interestingly, the population 
of a country does not affect variations in the debt level. This finding does not support previous 
studies which argue that larger member states face greater difficulties in meeting the Pact’s 
provisions be it due to the fact that the cost of fiscal consolidation tends to be larger in bigger 
countries and that smaller countries pay a lower price for good fiscal reputation (Laurent and Le 
Cacheux 2004) or that larger member states are less effected by peer pressure and damages to their 
political reputation due to a larger political clout (de Haan et al. 2003). 
  
The second column displays the specification after the six political variables have been added. With 
this addition, the overall explanatory power of the model increases marginally (around 1 per cent). 
In brief, this set of variables does not bring much additional explanatory power to the baseline 
specification. Firstly, there is no evidence for an electoral cycle. Contrary to Mink and de Haan 
(2006), we find no evidence for expansionary fiscal policies during election years. Secondly, an 
increase in the weight of centrist or right wing parties' power does not seem to have any significant 
impact on the change in debt, results consistent with inter alia Pampel and Williamson (1988). 
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Thirdly, there is no significant impact from the set of variables describing the type of government in 
power; single majority or minority. In addition, if these variables are crossed with the variable 
'election year', no evidence can be found that coalition governments would be likely to find it more 
difficult to agree on a fiscal sobriety during election years. Moreover, in contrast to Busemeyer 
(2004), no significant impact from the single majority variable at times of election can be found. 
Finally, the ideological gap between new cabinet and the old one has also no significant impact. All 
the political variables are jointly not significant (p-value of 0.2). In addition, the Europeanization 
(SGP) and political variables show a similar result (p-value of 0.25) if tested jointly. For the 
countries and time-span analysed, no evidence of a significant impact of the political make up of 
government vis-à-vis fiscal performance was found. In sum, variations in government debt appear 
not to be caused by partisanship, electoral cycles, or government composition once controlled for 
the macroeconomic variables. 
  
Having controlled for the macroeconomic and political climate, what is the impact on the 
Europeanization variables on public finances? The empirical results displayed in the last three 
columns in Table 1 show evidence that the ‘SGP’ variable did not have a significant impact on the 
fiscal positioning of eurozone member states. The results hold when using the variable 
‘SGP_Maastricht’ or the combination of ‘SGP’ and ‘Maastricht’. Moreover, if the different 
specifications of Table 1 are used with a different sample, including three non member states as 
‘control group’ (Denmark, United Kingdom and Sweden), the results obtained still show that 'SGP' 
or ‘SGP_Maastricht’ or the combination of ‘SGP’ and ‘Maastricht’ have no significant impact.xv 
Apart for Austria, Germany and France, tests of differences in means for our dependent variable for 
the EMU member states show that all other countries have experienced a negative mean post-1998 
compared to a positive mean pre-1998. This reveals a significant change of pattern in the yearly 
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change in general government gross public debt as a share of GDP. Despite this reversal, our results 
suggest that the Europeanization variables seem not to play a significant role in shaping debt 
variations once the impact of macroeconomic variables is taken into account. What is more, tales of 
shrinking deficits have to be taken with a pinch of salt. Both the quality of the consolidation and the 
accuracy of the accounting practices of several member states have been brought into question (e.g. 
von Hagen et al. 2002). It is well established that political ownership of the SGP was waning during 
the first decade of EMU. The fiscal transgressions of Germany and France have resulted in a de 
facto suspension of the excessive deficit procedure leaving ‘naming and shaming’ as the only 
punishment for fiscally wayward states. The 2005 reform sought to boost Member States’ political 
ownership of the SGP. And indeed the 2005 to 2007 period saw budgetary improvements 
throughout the eurozone. Yet this was hardly the result of Europeanization pressures exerted by the 
Pact, but of a comparatively sunny economic outlook during ‘wasted good times’ (Schuknecht 
2009). During the Great Recession we witnessed a Member States-driven exegesis of fiscal rules 
and a loose reading of the exceptionality provisions of the SGP with largely uncoordinated stimulus 
programmes to mitigate the economic fallout (Cameron 2012). As the eurozone was faced with the 
most severe recession of its young history, fiscal rules fell (naturally) to the wayside.  
 
If EMU’s rules did not impact on national fiscal policy choices, neither in times of economic 
growth nor in times of recession, can a shared fiscal policy paradigm function as a substitute for 
binding institutional commitment? Our findings suggest that the answer is no. The last two columns 
of Table 1 display the results for the two variables measuring a country’s Stability Culture. First, 
the standardized ideational measure of inflation aversion is not significant in explaining the change 
in debt. When we use the weighted measure of inflation aversion by actual inflation, the raw data 
from Eurobarometer or the residuals from a regression purged from 'economic noises', the results 
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are similar. Furthermore, the results obtained with one or many additional time lags of our various 
versions of ‘inflation aversion’, reflecting a more medium to long-term impact on the dependent 
variable, show similar results. Secondly, the ideational variable ‘economic orthodoxy’ is also not 
significant in explaining the change in debt. Wessels and Linsenmann (2002: 68) suggest that 
eurozone member states will comply with the SGP ‘not only because of the threat of sanctions but 
mainly because the “sound finances and money” paradigm has entered the economic beliefs of 
national policy-makers as a “collective identity”’. Yet our findings show that, all other things being 
equal, the state of Stability Culture, both within the population at large as well as policy-makers in 
power, has no significant effect on the fiscal positioning of EMU member states and consequently 
on compliance with the SGP.  
  
One may hypothesize that in times of economic ‘good weather’ the pressure to europeanize fiscal 
policy may be less compelling. In order to investigate if that is the case we subdivide our sample of 
209 observations in two; one subsample for which we observe only positive values of real GDP 
annual growth in % (196 observations) and for negative values (13 observations). The smaller 
sample of 102 observations, if we include our variables for Stability Culture, leaves us with two 
subsamples of 93 and 9 observations (for positive and negative values respectively). Most of our 
sample covers ‘good weather’ years. The large disproportion of positive annual growth observations 
in our sample means that we have too few observations to estimate our models for negative growth 
years and that our results for the positive growth subsample is very similar to the one we already 
display.xvi  
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We complement the results from our multivariate analysis by looking at the pairwise correlation 
between each of our controls and the change in government debt. We find that ‘economic 
orthodoxy’ and four out of five of our ‘inflation aversion’ measures are not significantly correlated 
pairwise with the change in government debt at a 10% significance level. Furthermore, all six 
political controls have non-significant pairwise correlations with government debt. Out of the three 
variables we use for measuring SGP effect, only one (SGP) has a significant correlation with 
government debt. These results tend to indicate that, not controlling for macroeconomic variables, 
these variables are on the whole not significantly correlated with our dependent variable. It is 
interesting to note that alongside these results the pairwise correlations of most macroeconomic 
variables with government debt are significant. 
 
We now turn to the second part of our empirical investigation where we look at the determinants for 
non-compliance with EMU’s fiscal rules. For that purpose we use a probit model with a dummy for 
non-compliance as the dependent variable. This dummy takes value one if the variable ‘∆debt’ (∆ in 
general government gross public debt as share of GDP in per cent) is larger than three per cent and 
zero otherwise. The table results for the probit estimation are not shown here, due to space 
constraints, but can be obtained from the authors upon request. Broadly they depict a similar picture 
as our preceding pooled cross-section analysis. For the countries and time-span analysed, no 
evidence of a significant impact of the political make-up of government vis-à-vis fiscal compliance 
was found. Our measure of Europeanization, ‘SGP’ (or alternatively ‘SGP_Maastricht’ or the 
combination of ‘SGP’ and ‘Maastricht’) has no significant impact either. Similarly, our measure of 
Stability Culture ‘inflation aversion’ is not significant in explaining the breach in fiscal rules. 
However, the results for ‘economic orthodoxy’ are ambiguous. In few specifications strong 
orthodoxy reduces significantly the likelihood of non-compliance. Yet, the marginal impacts on the 
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goodness of fit (pseudo-R2) of both ‘inflation worry’ and ‘economic orthodoxy’ taken together are 
very small at around 1 per cent. In other words, these variables do have a very little explanatory 
power, which suggests that the state of Stability Culture has virtually no impact on compliance with 
the SGP. 
  
Conclusion 
  
We find strong evidence that the change in government debt is primarily driven by the state of the 
domestic economy. In contrast to other studies, we detect no consistent empirical support for the 
claim that political or ideational factors influence compliance with EMU’s fiscal rules. 
Furthermore, the influence of Europeanization processes on public finance is called into question; 
being a member of the eurozone does not significantly impact on a country’s fiscal performance. 
Notably, the anchorage of a eurozone member state’s Stability Culture, both within policy-makers 
and the population at large, does not influence the change in government debt.  
  
Our analysis shows that ideational factors have no significant role in shaping the Europeanization of 
fiscal policy once we control for macroeconomic variables. Yet, we do not wish to suggest that 
EMU suffers from an absence of ideas. Ideas do matter. Arguably, vocal adherence to the SGP and 
its stability paradigm can play an important role as part of policy-makers’ strategies to justify their 
actions. But, in economically difficult times, the desire to affirm fiscal prudence is increasingly 
compromised by fiscal realities.  
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Against this backdrop, our estimates cast doubt on the prospects of the reformed SGP (under the so-
called Six Pack). There is little reason to assume that SGP III will exert more substantial 
Europeanization pressures. The current experience of the SGP’s Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) 
shows that member states are cautious not to escalate the procedure and avoid moving it up to the 
newly introduced reversed majority voting (Hodson 2013). Since (re-)opening a wave of EPDs in 
2008/2009, the already delayed deadlines for correction the excessive deficit have been further set 
and revised copiously, which involves commending EDP countries for having ‘complied’ with 
Article 126(7) recommendations. The corollary of this practise may well be that ‘peer pressure’ 
erodes further as member states congratulate themselves on actions taken. Individual countries’ 
austerity politics are consequently not the result of pressure exerted by EMU’s fiscal rules, but can 
rather be attributed to the conditionality of financial assistance with notable differences between 
debtor and creditor countries’ consolidation efforts.  
 
The clarion calls for a new Stability Culture in Europe appear to be nothing more than the strategic 
adoption of a common rhetoric. Our results show that neither a population’s inflation aversion nor 
policy-makers’ pledge to ‘sound’ public finances translate into lower deficits. Offering cultural 
repentance as a remedy to the eurozone’s current woes by promoting ‘German Stability Culture [as] 
a common good of all the participating states’ (Merkel 2012) is presumptuous. In fact, our data 
show that on average Germany has a lower mean for inflation aversion (Eurobarometer raw data) 
than Italy, Portugal and Spain. What is more, in the context of post-crisis EMU, that is post 
financial sector bailout, attributing soaring debt and deficit levels to cultural recklessness is 
politically dishonest. Ultimately the Europeanization of fiscal policy will need to rely on more than 
weak rules and the myth of German cultural superiority. 
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APPENDIX 1: Econometric Issues 
  
The existence of several binary dummy variables of interest renders the use of a common panel data 
estimator, with fixed or random effects to capture the cross-sectional heterogeneity, impossible. 
Moreover, the model employed includes institutional and political variables that tend to be constant, 
or not varying considerably over time. Therefore, a pooled cross-section analysis is necessary and 
will be based on the conventional estimation technique of ordinary least squares (OLS). 
  
A preliminary test indicates that the estimates suffer from heteroskedasticity, which does not come 
as a surprise. The standard errors are corrected for group-wise heteroscedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation across countries of the errors with panel-corrected standard errors.xvii 
Contemporaneous macro-variables are interlinked. Output growth, the unemployment rate, and the 
interest rate may be affected by contemporaneous fiscal shocks. This may create biases and raises 
additional doubts about the validity of the estimates. 
  
To deal with this potential problem we use the instrumental variables estimation technique. The 
macroeconomic variables are instrumented with the lag of these five variables: real GDP growth, 
output gap (defined as the difference between potential GDP and actual GDP), long term interest 
rates, changes in unemployment rates and US long-term interest rates. These instruments are 
individually significant in the first stage; however, this does not in itself guarantee a successful 
identification in the second stage estimation. Hence, we use the Kleibergen-Paap rk F-statistic, a 
correspondingly robust version of the Cragg-Donald statistics to test for weak instruments. The 
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combination of the five lagged variables listed above is selected since it provides the highest 
statistics (7.96 obtained for the baseline model). This value is between the Stock-Yogo weak ID test 
critical values for a 5 per cent and 10 per cent maximal IV relative bias. Despite the fact that the 
statistic is not particularly strong, we can consider that weak instruments are not a serious problem 
in our case. Furthermore, the Hansen J statistics suggest that the instruments are not correlated with 
the error term at a 10 per cent level. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM-statistics for overall identification 
allows us to strongly reject the null hypothesis that the equation is under-identified. 
  
In sum, the results suggest the model used is reliable. We then proceed to compare the estimates, 
with and without instrumentation, in order to check if the macroeconomic variables suffer from 
endogeneity or not. In order to do this, we use the results obtained from the two-stage least squares 
using the STATA command ivreg2 with clusters (Baum et al., 2007). The results of the 
implemented test, defined as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics, suggest that we cannot 
reject the null that the specified endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous with a 
p-value of 0.33. It can also be argued that the Europeanization variable ‘SGP’ may be considered 
endogenous. For instrumenting this variable we use the debt level in 1997. This variable reflects the 
need for adequate fiscal measures and initiatives to meet the goals set in the SGP in the years to 
follow. The test shows that this variable can also be treated as exogenous. Consequently, we use 
only non-instrumented estimates for carrying out the inference. The results not shown from 2SLS 
can be obtained from the authors. 
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APPENDIX 2: Variable Definition and data source 
 
Table A1. Variable Definitions and Data Source 
∆debt ∆ in general government gross public debt as share of GDP in % 
Real GDP growth 
in % real GDP annual growth in % 
∆unemployment 
rate ∆ in unemployment rate in % 
Debt service 
costs 
= ((rt-yt)/100)Dt  where r = real long-term interest rates; y = real GDP growth; 
D=debt/GDP ratio. 
Openness exports and imports as share of GDP in % 
Population in millions 
Output volatility standard deviation of real GDP growth over the past five years (t−5 to t−1) 
SGP dummy which takes value one if the country is a member of EMU and zero otherwise 
and this for the subset of years 1998 to 2006 
Maastricht 
dummy which takes value one if the country is a member of EMU and zero otherwise 
and this for the subset of years 1992 to 1997; for Austria and Finland the dummy takes 
value one for the years 1995 to 1997. For the three states that did not join the EMU 
(which are used only for our robustness checks), Maastricht takes value one for UK and 
Denmark over the years 1992-1997 and 1995-1997 for Sweden. 
Election year equals 1 if (at least one) election of the national parliament (lower house) took place 
during the year; =0 otherwise 
Right equals right wing parties in percentage of total cabinet posts, weighted by days 
Centre equals centre parties in percentage of total cabinet posts, weighted by days 
Single majority equals 1 if single party majority; = 0 otherwise 
Minority equals 1 if single party minority or multiparty minority or caretaker govt; =0 otherwise 
Gov_gap 
‘ideological gap’ between new cabinet and old one, calculated as the difference of the 
index value (govparty) of the outgoing and the incoming government. Govparty is 
defined according to Cabinet composition, Schmidt (1992): (1) hegemony of right-wing 
(and centre) parties (left = 0); (2) dominance of right-wing (and centre) parties (left < 
33.3); (3) balance of power between left and right (33.3 < left < 66.6); (4) dominance of 
social-democratic and other left parties (left > 66.6); (5) hegemony of social-democratic 
and other left parties (left = 100); where left = left-wing parties in percentage of total 
cabinet posts, weighted by days. 
Inflation aversion 
Percentage of respondents who named inflation as one answer to the questions: 1) 
There is a lot of talk these days about what (our country’s) goals should be for the next 
ten or fifteen years. On this card are listed some of the goals that different people say 
should be given top priority. Would you please say which one of them you yourself 
consider to be most important in the long-run? And what would be your second choice? 
(Eurobarometer 1984-1993) and 'What do you think are the two most important issues 
facing (our country) at the moment?' (Eurobarometer 2003-2006). 
Economic 
orthodoxy 
Percentage of sentences (with respect to the overall number of sentences) in the parties’ 
election programs which comprised of positive statements with respect to reduction of 
budget deficits, retrenchment in crisis, thrift and savings in the face of economic 
hardship, support for traditional economic institutions such as stock market and banking 
system and support for strong currency, – all of which are key ingredients for Stability 
Culture. If there is more than one party in a coalition government, the government’s 
index value is an average of the separate index values of all coalition partners, weighted 
by their seats in parliament. Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2006)  
Source: Eurobarometer, OECD, Armingeon et al. (2008), Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2006)  
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i In addition to the SGP, a complex set of other economic coordination processes under the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC, Hodson and Maher 2001) has sought to provide a framework for 
the conduct of economic policies which may touch upon fiscal policies. 
ii We are working with an arguably narrow understanding of the Europeanization of fiscal policy. 
Our focus of investigation lies with the state of public finances as measured by the change in 
government debt. In other words, we are not discussing issues pertaining to economic governance 
such as tax harmonization, fiscal transfers, Eurobonds or a common fiscal policy. 
iii Austria, Belgium, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Finland, France, Germany, Portugal and Spain; 
Luxembourg as well as Greece (although not a member of the very first wave) are excluded due to a 
lack of data for some variables. 
iv Smaller countries are more open as the correlation between ‘population’ and ‘openness’ shows 
with a value of -0.58. 
v We are not addressing the impact of national fiscal governance. For an analysis of domestic 
institutions/fiscal rules see Hallerberg et al. (2007). What is more, we are not denying the two-way 
causality of European integration that has been elucidated by the dichotomy between bottom-up and 
top-down processes (Börzel 1999), nor are we denying that other Europeanization process (e.g. 
under the OMC) may impact on public finances. For analytical purposes our study adopts a top-
down approach of Europeanization, even though these two processes are in reality interwoven in a 
highly complex manner. Concretely, it has been well-documented that member states’ ideas, 
interests and ideologies have shaped the rules of EMU (Hoekstra et al. 2008). We control for 
national specific conditions by clustering for countries. We would hence not assume any bias for 
the variables of our ‘Europeanization matrix’. 
vi For Austria and Finland the dummy takes value one for the years 1995-97. 
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vii These are proxies for Stability Culture. As Guiso et al. (2006: 26) put it ‘a necessary first step is 
to define culture in a sufficiently narrow way, so that it becomes easier to identify a causal link 
from culture to economic outcomes’. 
viii We are aware of proxying popular Stability Culture on the basis of one of its two components. 
Lack of data for measuring ‘deficit aversion’ prevented us from sizing its fiscal component. 
However, working solely with ‘inflation aversion’ should not present a problem as the two 
components go hand in hand and are likely to be highly correlated. It is by now established that the 
link between deficits and inflation is tentative at best and does not apply to low-inflation advanced 
economies (Catao and Terrones 2005). Yet, the economic accuracy of the alleged transition 
mechanism deficit-inflation is almost irrelevant in this context. At the heart of the construction of 
the pan-European Stability Culture was the claim that high deficits would cause inflation (EMI 
1996), an assertion that was repeated with the reformed SGP (Gonzalez-Paramo 2005) and in the 
aftermath of the financial and economic crisis (Stark 2010). The fact that the monetisation of public 
debt is no longer an option in EMU does not appear to have changed policy-maker and central 
banker’s rhetoric. 
ix For a full description of the two Eurobarometer questions for the periods 1984-93 and 2003-06 
see the Appendix. If we take only either one of the two waves of data for our estimations (thus 
having one constant question) the results still hold. 
x Interestingly, the correlations between ‘economic orthodoxy’ with ‘left’, ‘right’ and ‘centre’, 
which account for the distribution of power (see matrix P of variables above), are -0.2, -0.03 and 
0.26 respectively. 
xi Of all the relevant variables available in the Manifesto Data Set one additional variable could be 
considered a potential proxy. ‘Keynesian Demand Management’ shows the percentage of sentences 
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(with respect to the overall number of sentences) in the parties’ election programs which comprised 
of ‘Demand-oriented economic policy; economic policy devoted to the reduction of depressions 
and/or to increase private demand through increasing public demand and/or through increasing 
social expenditures’. However, for most countries it stays almost constant for the entire period of 
analysis (1984-2006). Six countries out of ten in our dataset have six or less non-zero observations 
for the entire series of 22 observations (the other values being zeros). Such an invariant proxy is 
bound to yield non-reliable results. For that reason this variable is left out of the analysis. 
xii The structure of the panel dataset is unbalanced as several years of data for Spain (1984-89) and 
Portugal (1984-94) are missing. 
xiii All tests carried out in the section are done at the 10 per cent significance level. 
xiv We also ran a simple AR(1) process which displays an R-square of 0.28. This shows that the 
additional macroeconomic variables we use have a significant scope in explaining our dependent 
variable. All additional analyses, alternative model specifications and estimates mentioned in this 
article are available from the authors on request. 
xv As a robustness check we also used and alternative variable to ‘Maastricht’ inspired by Hallerberg 
et al. (2007) which is a measure of the lagged fiscal convergence (deficit to GDP ratio – 3 per cent) 
when deficit stood above the 3 per cent threshold and 0 otherwise for the years 1992-97. Results are 
similar. 
xvi Alternatively we created subsamples for which we observe only positive values of our dependent 
variable Δdebt (113 observations) and for negative values (96 observations). The smaller sample of 
102 observations, when we include our variables for Stability Culture, leaves us with two 
subsamples of 66 and 36 observations (for positive and negative values respectively). These are 
deemed to small to carry out the analysis and so our robustness checks are done without the 
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Stability Culture variables. The results with both subsamples (not shown but available upon 
request) indicate that the variable SGP has no significant impact across specifications whether the 
country is in a ‘good or bad’ fiscal period. Our main conclusion is reinforced by these robustness 
checks. 
xvii We use the Stata command xtpcse with the option ‘pair-wise’ as our panel dataset is unbalanced. 
